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Rational to the Changing Labour Market;
from family to individual application of social insurance
Mitsuya Ichien
Social insurance originally started as a system for the protection
of the employed and gradually expanded to include the self-
employed and rural population. In Japan a nation-wide coverage
of medical care and pension insurance for all was attained in 1961.
Since then, the social insurance schemes have grown as more and
more people have become employees throughout the period of
economic growth. But lately the tendency has reversed and many
female adults came to join the labour market as low-paid part-
timer workers. As they try to maintain the status of dependant of
their husbands' insurance schemes by managing their income
below the threshold, they do not contribute to the cost of social
insurance. The aim of the paper is to show that a standard contri
bution principle can be applied to employees as well as the self-
employed and to present a fair mechanism for allocating resources
to all the schemes, according to the standard benefit cost of each.
The proposed system of total risk adjustment for health insurance
schemes can be an alternative to the much debated health insur
ance reforms for the elderly.
Introduction
Social insurance, which has been developed in Western Society
throughout the last century, now faces a period of a fundamental reform.
Occupation-based social insurance was born as a scheme to deal with
social anxiety of industrial workers who supported their families. Later
social insurance have extended to be applied for not only employees but
also the self-employed around World War n. However, occupation-based
schemes have always been the centre for development of social insurance
as a whole. This process was similarly seen in Japan. Coverage of occupa
tion-based social insurance extended as more came to be employed in the
industrial sector and their benefits have been substantiated throughout the
period of economic growth after the war. Social insurance for the self-
employed, etc. was developed to catch up with this. What is called the
nation-wide coverage has thus been established.
However, the economic environment started to change after the oil
shock in 1973, and people's lifestyle patterns throughout their lives also
started to change along with this. Family forms and employment forms
have also been diversified. The proportion of the number of typical male
workers who support all their family members by themselves started to
decline in all the labour force. As a result, social insurance designed on the
assumption of such regular fulltime workers started to face organizational
difficulties. For the purpose of establishing anxiety-free social insurance
schemes for all people and for all cases, it appears necessary to change the
occupation-based social insurance to the individual-based social insurance
in which all individuals can participate by themselves whatever their status
in the families and occupation (whether they are single, married, unem
ployed, self-employed, etc.).
Scandinavian countries with highly developed social security schemes
use taxes as their financial sources. By changing the present social insur
ance system to the tax financed social security system, we could overcome
the difficulties of social insurance system, such as difficulties of application
to low-paid workers thus leaving them with insufficient benefit. According
ly, an idea of changing social insurance to tax financed social security has
became attractive.
However, the tax method has its own problems. Because benefits are
not determined as a return on contribution, they become flat rate and tend
to be low. The difference is evident between flat rate social insurance in the
U.K. and income-related social insurance in Germany and France. Sweden
used to have only tax-financed flat rate pension and in 1960s it introduced
income-related extra pension on top of the flat rate pension. Moreover,
Sweden changed the tax-financed basic pensions to the contribution-based
social insurance by the amendment law of 1994'". In this sense, it is desir
able that Japan, which has experiences in social insurance method in pen
sion, medical care, long-term care, should continue to use social insurance
by reforming it to suit to the new social and economic conditions.
This paper examines how the present social insurance should be
changed to the new individual based social insurance that can be applied
to all circumstances of individual with various lifestyles and ways of work
ing. In the first section, we will clarify how employment statuses have been
changed, and how the present social insurance is malfunctioning. In the
second section, we will analyse the actual situation of the National Health
Insurance, which accepts all those who cannot belong to the public and
private employee health insurance schemes. In the final section, we will
present an example of rational individualized contribution system with
complete risk structure adjustment system applied to different insurers.
Change in employment status and health Insurance schemes
One of the reasons why social security reforms became necessary is
aging of population. The government renews future population projection
on the basis of the result of a national census carried out every five years.
The future financial estimates of social security schemes are also reviewed
each time on the basis of this projection. The National Institute of Popula
tion and Social Security Research announced a new population projection
in January 2002, but its medium projection showed the future proportion
of elderly people higher than that of the previous projection in 1997. From
this, it is estimated that the future financial state for social security will
become tightened further^'. Amid such circumstances, the policy to in
crease the number of future insured people who can assume the burden
of taxes and contributions becomes important in order to secure stable
financial resources for social security.
Table 1 shows the trend of labour force participation ratios, etc. for 35
years from 1965. In Japan in 1961 medical care insurance schemes started
to be adopted for all people and contributions for the National Pension
started to be paid. The period of these 35 years can, therefore, be seen
broadly as a period where change in labour force, etc. has been followed
after the attainment of nation-wide health and pension insurance coverage.
As can be seen in the table, the total population increased and in line with
this increase the productive age population from 15 years old to 64 years
old also showed an increase. Ratios of labour force population to produc
tive age population (labour participation ratio) started to rise around 1975
and as a result the ratio of the labour force population to the total popula
tion increased especially from the latter half of the 1980s.
Figures 1 and 2 show more concrete change in labour participation
ratios by sex and age. In the case of males, it can be seen that the ratios
either declined or remained stable in all ages, and did not contribute to the
rise in labour participation ratios as explained above. Compared to this, in
the case of females, it can be seen that all ages except under 20 years of
age tended to increase and the rise in labour participation ratios during this
period is caused by participation of adult females between 20 years old and
60 years old.
Table 1 Trend of Total Population, Productive Age Population and
Labour Force Population
Year
Total Population
(in 10 thousand)
Productive Age
Population to
Total Population
(Age: from 15 to 64)
Labour Force
Population to
Productive Age
Population
Labour Force
Population to
Total Population
1965 9,803 68.0% 71.8% 48.8%
1970 10,357 69.1% 72.0% 49.8%
1975 11,158 67.7% 70.4% 47.7%
1980 11,683 67.3% 71.8% 48.4%
1985 12,078 68.0% 72.6% 49.4%
1990 12,354 69.6% 74.2% 51.7%
1995 12,557 69.1% 76.8% 53.1%
2000 12,688 68.1% 78.3% 53.3%
(Source) Minister's Secretariat Statistics and Information Department Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare [2001a]
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Such a rise in the female employment rate was not brought about sim
ply by females' participation in the labour market that had been dominated
by males. Figure 3 shows change of distribution of workers' status of
employment. According to this, the number of employees has shown a
major increase, while agriculture and forestry largely declined and the
number of the self-employed and family workers also fell. Temporary
employees and daily employees particularly showed a significant increase,
the number increasing by 2.6 times from 2.53 million in 1965 to 6.62 million
in 2000.
Table 2 shows the trend of the total number of employees and the
ratios of part-time employees who work for less than 35 hours per week on
average. The number of employees increased by 20.3 million in 30 years,
out of which 8.37 million were, however, an increase in part-time employ
ees. Furthermore, 10.21 million, which corresponded to a little more than
half of the increase in the number of employees, were females, while 6.24
million, which corresponds to three fourths of the increase in the number
of part-time employees, were females. As such, the increase in the number
of employees in this period was largely contributed by an increase in
female part-time employees.
Figure 3 Changes in Status of Employment
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Table 2 Trend of Part-time Employees (in 10 thousand, %)
Total of male and female Female
Year
Number of Number of Ratio Number of Number of Ratio
employees
a
part-time
employees b
b/a
%
employees
a
part-time
employees b
b/a
%
1970 3,222 216 6.7 1,068 130 12.2
1975 3,556 353 9.9 1,127 198 17.6
1980 3,866 390 10.1 1,324 256 19.3
1985 4,231 471 11.1 1,516 333 22.0
1990 4,748 722 15.2 1,795 501 27.9
1995 5,161 896 17.4 2,000 632 31.6
2000 5,252 1,053 20.0 2,089 754 36.1
Increase 2,030 837 13.3 1,021 624 23.9
(Source) Minister's Secretariat Statistics and Information Department, Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare [2001a]
Table 3 shows the trend of similar situations in European countries. The
author who cited this table clarified the following as a general trend: The
number of breadwinners in a family increased from one to two; A family
became able to manage to maintain its living costs by two workers; The
second worker in a family tended to be a part-time worker, and the number
of part-time workers greatly increased^'.
Table 3 Proportions of Part-time Employees and Their Changes in
Major Countries (in %)
Country
Total of Male and Female Female
Ratios of Part-time Employees Ratios of Part-time Employees
1975 1991 Increase 1975 1991 Increase
Belgium 3.6 13.3 9.7 10.8 30.5 19.7
Denmark 18.0 24.1 6.1 40.2 38.3 -1.9
France 5.7 12.3 6.6 12.2 23.6 11.4
Germany 8.8 15.3 6.5 23.2 34.0 10.8
Ireland 3.2 9.0 5.8 7.6 17.2 9.6
Italy 3.3 5.1 1.8 6.8 9.7 2.9
Luxembourg 4.1 7.5 3.4 14.1 18.4 4.3
Netherlands 5.8 32.0 26.2 18.9 58.6 39.7
U.K. 17.7 23.3 5.6 41.7 43.7 2.0
(Source) Webb [1995]
The labour force ratio of females is not yet as high as that of males.
It can therefore be expected that females will further contribute to an
increase in the number of the insured in the aging society. Although the
labour participation ratio of females has actually shown a steady increase
so far, it can be seen that most of them had a limited role to assist male
regular fulltime works within families. This is caused by the present income
tax and social security system adopted on the assumption of the male
breadwinner employee employment system.
Table 4 shows the changes of part-time workers, temporary workers,
etc. classified by the ways of calling at workplaces. The number of employ
ees increased by 9.12 million in the last 12 years, out of which approxi
mately 5.00 million were female part-time, etc. workers. Table 5 suggests
that in cases of males, a substantial proportion of irregular workers is the
young age stratum such as people in their 20s, but that in cases of females,
it is composed of people in their 30s and older, implying that the wife stra
tum comprises the majority of this group. If we compare marital status of
male and female irregular workers, it is apparent that many males were
unmarried but an overwhelming majority of females 'have a spouse', and
that part-timers, etc. were overwhelmingly spouses of the male head of a
household.
Table 4 Changes of Part-time Workers, Temporary Workers, etc.
(in 10 thousand, %)
Total of Male
and Female
Male
Employees excluding Executives
Female
Employees excluding Executives
Employ
ees
Employees
excluding
Those in
Managerial
Position
Regular
Staff
Part-
time
Workers
Tempo
rary
Workers
Others
Regular
Staff
Part-
time
Workers
Tempo
rary
Workers
Others
1986
ratio (%)
4,322 4,056
100.0
2,365
92.6
60
0.7
188
2.9
87
3.8
1,018
67.8
363
24.2
69
4.6
51
3.4
2001
ratio (%)
5,307 4,968
100.0
2,554
89.7
62
1.2
196
5.5
105
3.7
1,078
57.1
697
30.7
184
8.3
101
3.8
Number
increased
985 912 189 2 8 18 60 334 115 50
(Source) Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency [1987], Statistics Bureau, Manage
ment and Coordination Agency [2001]
Table 5 Distribution of Part-time Workers, Temporary Workers, etc.
(for 2001, in 10 thousand)
Male Female
Part-
time
Workers
Tempo
rary
Workers
Dispatched
workers
from
temporary
labour
agency
Others
Part-
time
Workers
Tempo
rary
Workers
Dispatched
workers
from
temporary
labour
agency
Others
Total number 62 196 11 94 697 118 34 69
15-24 7 113 2 3 28 100 4 6
out of which
the number
in school
1 80 0 0 2 68 0 0
Age 25-34 8 36 3 11 103 40 19 20
35-44 4 8 1 7 184 18 6 15
45-54 6 12 1 13 236 17 3 14
55-64 20 15 2 35 126 7 1 10
65- 18 12 1 25 21 2 0 3
Relation Unmarried 18 150 6 18 67 126 21 22
ship with With a spouse 40 38 4 70 544 50 11 39
a spouse Widowed/divorced 4 7 0 5 86 8 2 8
Heads of household 39 37 4 68 54 7 1 5
Relation
ship with
head of
house
Their spouses
Children and
spouses of children
0
11
0
101 4
0
9
483
95
43
95
10
17
36
18
hold Other relatives 2 7 0 2 17 9 2 1
Living alone 10 51 2 14 48 29 5 1
(Source) Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency [2001]
Table 6 shows the number of weekly working hours and income of
part-time, etc. employees. Their number of weekly working hours tends to
be small and their income to be low in general. This tendency is more
strongly seen in female cases. Their annual income is predominantly in the
range of over ¥500,000 and less than ¥1,500,000. The reason why they
choose such employment practices is related to the income tax system and
the social security system.
Table 6 Distribution of Part-time Workers, Temporary Workers, etc.
(for 2000, in 10 thousand)
Male Female
Part-time
workers
Tempo
rary
workers
Others
Part-time
workers
Tempo
rary
workers
Others
Total number 56 176 106 652 179 87
Weekly 1-34 30 98 29 465 133 36
working 35- 26 71 72 166 46 50
hours
Less than 500,000 7 53 6 92 76 9
50-99 12 50 8 313 57 14
100-149 14 27 12 158 27 16
150-199 7 16 13 56 11 13
Income 200-299 8 17 26 29 8 23
from work 300-399 4 7 15 5 1 6
400-499 1 2 10 2 0 2
500-699 1 1 9 1 — 2
700-999 1 0 5 — — 0
1000-1499 — 0 1 — — —
1500- — 0 0 — — —
(Source) Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency [2000]
The report announced in July 2001 by 'the Study Group on Equal
Participation of Men and Women' prepared by the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry points out that the decisive factor causing the women's
short annual working hours is not the income tax system (allowance for
spouse and special allowance for spouse), but spouse allowance system in
company wage systems (in many cases spouse allowance will not be pro
vided if her income exceeds ¥1.03 million a year) and the treatment of the
dependants in social insurance system (if a wife's annual income exceeds
10
¥1.30 million, she is not treated as a dependant in her husband's insurance
and she has to become insured herself by paying contribution). It suggests
that spouse allowance must be abolished and that the treatment of the
dependant must be abolished (Study Group on Equal Participation of Men
and Women [2001]). If we abolish the dependant status for working wives,
as suggested by the above Study Group, we can expect to increase insur
ance contributors and expect women to work as much as they want. If this
could lead to lowering of social insurance and other fringe benefit costs of
the regular breadwinner male employees, the gap of working conditions
between regular workers and irregular workers, men and women, etc. will
become smaller.
Social security has been organized on the assumption that the bread
winner of a family supports the whole family and companies have sup
ported the system both in respect of wages and fringe benefits. What
actually supported the development of social security after the war were
employee schemes such as health insurance and welfare pension. Nation
wide health insurance coverage and nation-wide pension system have
been strengthened in line with their expansion and development.
However, a reverse phenomenon started to be seen in this respect in
the recession after the 1990s. For example, in the case of health insurance,
some of the health insurance societies of big companies have been dis
solved, and the insured of the societies shifted to Government-Managed
Health Insurance. The insured of Government-Managed Health Insurance
further shifted to National Health Insurance. This is exactly the reverse
movement of what had occurred before. In other words, the driving force
that had led the development of social insurance has diminished, and the
adverse shifting is taking place to a financially weaker insurance scheme
and to an insurance scheme for which insurance principles are difficult to
apply and greater state subsidy is necessary.
Figure 4 shows the trend of the number of people covered (both the
insured and the dependants) by different health insurance schemes.
Covered population of the mutual aid associations (mainly for public sector
employees) is declining. Covered population of Health Insurance (Govern
ment-Managed and Society-Managed Health Insurance, both for private
sector employees), which had been on the increase, also started to fall
from 1995 towards 2000. On the contrary. National Health Insurance, which
is mainly for the self-employed, agricultural workers and pensioners
11
among others, greatly increased in the last 5 years.
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Figure 4 Trend of Covered Population by
Medical Insurance Scheme
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(Source) National Federation of Health Insurance Societies
[1976-2001]
Figure 5 shows the recent trend of public pension coverage. Because of
conformity of data, the trend is seen only after 1990. Here a recent increase
in No.1 insured persons of National Pension is evident. No.1 insured of
National Pension is the self-employed and agricultural workers, etc. and
equivalent to the insured of National Health Insurance. The increase of
No.1 insured reflects the shift of labour market from regular stable employ
ment to irregular unstable employment.
From the above, it can be seen that people's working style and life style
have been diversified in line with a greater number of females having con
tributed to the total labour force. This diversification of working style may
partly be due to the recession in the 1990s. But it should be stressed that it
also reflects a long-term trend of people's changing attitude toward their
style of work and way of living. People came to change employment easily.
They came to marry less and late and have only one or two children. Both
men and women came to work to make up their living. During their life
course, people came to experience varying types of work and different sta
tus in family. Until they become adults, people are supported as depend-
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[1991 to 2001]
ants. Getting work to do, people become Independent. Getting married,
and having children, people come to support dependant family. Later, peo
ple may become unemployed, self-employed, sick or disabled. They may
be divorced or become widowed. During these life courses, people who
ever possible should pay contribution and people whoever benefit Is neces
sary should receive benefit at any time.
We will now examine the structure of social Insurance that fits well to
these various employment and family situations. In more precise, we will
focus on how National Health Insurance Is applied to different workers and
different families, and we will provide an example of how National Health
Insurance can be extended to the entire population.
The insured of National Health insurance and the method of charging
Insurance contribution
National Health Insurance scheme has been considered as a scheme
having a strong welfare element to extend the coverage of health Insur
ance to those who had not been Included by the employee schemes,
namely self-employed, agricultural workers, employees of small busi-
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nesses, and others. Compared to the employee insurance schemes, which
function as independent insurance schemes. National Health Insurance is a
scheme that can only be managed with substantial pubic subsidy.
Figure 6 shows change in occupation distribution of heads of house
holds of National Health Insurance between 1961 when nation-wide cover
age was effected and 1999. In 1961, 45% of the heads of households were
engaged in agriculture and forestry and 24% of them were the self-
employed. National Health Insurance had a character of being a regional
insurance for people engaged in agriculture and the self-employed. Under
the nation-wide coverage of health insurance schemes. National Health
Insurance had taken responsibility to cover particular occupational groups
not included in Mutual aid schemes for public servants and Health
Insurance for private sector employees.
Figure 6 Changes In Occupations of Heads of Households of
Municipality-Managed Health Insurance
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[2001]
Today, in contrast, 48% of the heads of households of National Health
Insurance are without occupation. About 90% of the people without occu
pation are older than 60, and this characteristic will be strengthened further
with an increase in the number of the elderly^'. Most elderly people did not
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have income in 1961 and therefore they were treated as dependants of
employee's Health Insurance to which their children belonged. Today as
they come to have enough pension income they come to be treated as
independent insured belonging to municipality-managed National Health
Insurance. As a result, the rational of nation-wide health insurance system
with different schemes covering different occupations came to be vio
lated®'.
Table 7 shows the comparison of average income of heads of house
holds of National Health Insurance by occupation. Income of 'Self-
employed' and 'Other occupations' is a little less than ¥4 million, while
income of 'Agriculture and forestry' is a little less than ¥3 million and that
of 'Employees' is ¥2.7 million, and 'Without occupation' is a little more than
¥1 million. Insurance contributions of National Health Insurance are
decided for each household according to income, asset, number of family
members and set sum for each household. The reason why it uses factors
other than income to levy contribution is that their incomes are too low.
And this is the reason why large subsidies are given from central govern
ment and from local government as well.
Table 7 Average income by occupation of heads of household of
National Health Insurance (1999)
Occupation of head of
household
In 10 thousand
Number of persons
per household
Average income
per person
Agriculture and forestry 291.0 2.88 101.0
Self-employed 399.2 2.69 148.4
Employees 271.7 2.22 122.4
Other occupations 386.6 2.20 175.7
Without occupation 104.8 1.71 61.3
Total 217.0 2.08 104.3
(Source) Health Insurance Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare [2001]
However, if we exclude those without occupation, which comprise
approximately half of the households of National Health Insurance, the
incomes of the rest are not necessarily very low compared with the
employees. The average income of the total households of National Health
Insurance is only ¥2.17 million, but this overall low level is due to the very
low level of households without occupation.
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This point is clarified in Figure 7 showing accumulated distribution of
different income groups of different occupations of the heads of house
holds of National Health Insurance. The figure shows the percentage dis
tribution accumulated from the lowest by income group of different
occupations. The higher the location of the curve, the lower the income of
that occupation group. It can be seen that the Total Average' line is raised
by the 'Without Occupation' line, which is by far the highest. It can be seen
also that, if 'Without Occupation' were excluded, the new Total Average
line would move to the range between the lines of 'Employees' and 'self-
employed'.
Figure 7 Accumulated Distribution by Income Group
(by occupation of head of household of
National Health Insurance for 1999)
Total
Employees
Without
occupation
Agriculture and
forestry
Other
occupations
Self-employed
Income Group (in 10 thousand yen / year)
(Source) Health Insurance Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare [2001]
We should also note what is meant by 'income' here. Income used for
the purpose of levying National Health Insurance contribution is income for
local tax purpose and income after deducting allowances. In the case of
16
public pension they allow quite big sum to be deducted from it and this is
the reason why the average 'income' of those without occupation becomes
so low. In the case of employees of Health Insurance or Mutual Aid
Associations, their contributions are levied on their incomes before tax, in
other words before it is deducted any allowance for tax and other reasons.
Table 8 shows the amount of pension by income group of retired
households of National Health Insurance. You will notice that no-income
group of retired households receive on average public pensions of a little
less than ¥900,000. If we take income rage between ¥300,000 and ¥2 mil
lion, average taxable income exceeds corresponding average pension
income by about ¥1.20 million.
Table 8 Amount of Pension by Taxable Income Group of
Retired Households (in 10 thousand, in 1999)
Taxable Income
per household
A
Amount of Pension
per household
B
B —A
Total 234.6 234.6 0.0
No income 0 89.9 89.9
Less than ¥300,000 16.3 138.7 122.4
30-40 35 155.4 120.4
40-60 50 170.2 120.2
60-80 70 193.7 123.7
80-100 90 207.9 117.9
100-150 125 249.8 124.8
150-200 175 284.6 109.6
200-250 225 291.5 66.5
250-300 275 313.4 38.4
300-400 350 325.8
400-500 450 389.2
500-700 600 285.5
700-1000 850 237.1
¥10 million or over 1250 248.0
(Source) Health Insurance Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare [2001]
In cases of employees of Health Insurance, they pay contributions of set
rate levied upon their 'monthly standard remuneration', which does not
include ad hoc payments such as bonuses for which different contribution
rate of 1% is used. In order to compare income distributions of the em-
17
ployee schemes with that of National Health Insurance, monthly standard
remunerations of employees are converted to annual income by multiply
ing the former by 14.5 (annual income = standard remuneration x 14.5
months), assuming that average bonus of employees worths 2.5 times
their monthly remuneration. Figure 8 shows the distributions of annual
income of employees of different health insurance schemes and those
(self-employed and employees) of National Health Insurance.
Figure 8 clarifies that there is a difference between income of National
Health Insurance and that of the employee insurance schemes. One of
the elements to explain the difference is the difference of how well their
income is disclosed, the difference known as Togosan'. To-go-san literally
means ten-five-three, and expresses how different percentages of income
are disclosed for tax purpose. Employees are seized their income 100%,
whereas self-employed 50% and farmers 30%. To eliminate this element of
unfairness is itself an important matter, but here we will do what we can
Figure 8 Accumulated Distribution by income Group of Selected Occupation
of National Health insurance and Employees of Health insurance
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(Source) Health Insurance Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare [2001]
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and apply the same contribution principle used by National Health In
surance to all population including those of employee schemes. The idea
behind is that it is difficult now to divide people into two groups of employ
ees and self-employed, for it is getting more popular for people to experi
ence different occupations throughout their lives and that unification of
contribution system for employees and self-employed, etc. became neces
sary if we consider the diversity of work and family style. It is therefore nec
essary to establish standard contribution system where standard insurance
contributions are imposed and standard medical care benefits are pro
mised, irrespective of what schemes people belong to. By doing so, the dif
ference in ability of payment and the difference in risk due to age will be
completely adjusted for insurers. By doing so, all insurers will be given the
same financial conditions to compete for better management of their
health insurance®*.
Social insurance based on individual participation and financial adjust
ment by using state subsidy
The method of levying insurance contributions of National Health
Insurance is chosen by each insurer or municipality by using the combina
tion of four elements, namely household income, household asset, number
of household members and set sum for each household. As the contribu
tion levying methods differ among municipalities, the actual amounts of
contributions differ in different cities, towns or villages for households of
similar conditions. As mentioned above, the contributions working genera
tion pays are now not only for that generation but also for the retired gen
eration. This means that National Health Insurance of urban cities of young
people should financially support National Health Insurance of rural towns
and villages of mainly old people. In order to pursue this fairness of insur
ance contribution, we have to standardize contribution rate for all insurers
and we should have mechanism of delivering total revenue to all insurers
according to their standardized benefit needs.
Two lines of Figure 9 trace the average amounts of insurance contri
butions of different income groups of households in National Health In
surance and the amounts of hypothetical standardized contributions of
different income groups. The hypothetical contribution rate is set at 7% of
the previous year's household income plus a fixed sum of ¥30,000 and this
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is chosen so that the total revenue from this hypothetical standardized con
tribution equals the actual revenue of ¥3 trillion for fiscal 1999.
Figure 9 Actual Contributions of National Health Insurance and
Standardized Contributions
500,000 r
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Solid line = actual contributions
Dotted line
: ¥30,000+7% of income"
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(Source) Health Insurance Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare [2001]
One of the reasons why National Health Insurance Is unable to collect
sufficient insurance contributions is that pensioners' income is not properly
counted for income tax purpose and therefore for insurance contribution
purpose. By using the data of Table 8, we estimated the contribution rev
enue of pensioners if it were not for tax allowance for income of public
pension and if they were levied at the same standardized contribution rate
of 3% plus ¥30,000. On that assumption, we got total revenue of ¥ 3.37 tril
lion instead of ¥3 trillion for the fiscal year of 1999. Two lines of Figure 10
trace the actual amounts of insurance contributions of different income
groups of pensioners and the amounts of modified contributions of them.
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(Source) Health Insurance Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare [2001]
We now calculate what sort of figures we could get, if the same stan
dardized insurance contribution rate is plied to all the employees of Health
Insurance and Mutual Aid Associations.
We have already explained the method of adjusting the monthly stan
dard remuneration of Government-Managed Health Insurance to bring it
in line with the previous income of National Health Insurance, and have
shown the result in Figure 8. The insurance contribution revenue obtained
for the Government-Managed Health Insurance for fiscal 1999 by imposing
the same standard contribution rate as that for National Health Insurance
amounts to ¥4.41 trillion, which corresponds to about 74% of the actual
insurance contribution revenue of ¥5.93 trillion. Its total revenue amounts
to approximately ¥6.89 trillion and the difference of a little less than ¥1 tril
lion is a contribution of the National Treasury. Thus, if we apply new stan
dard contribution rate to the employees, their contribution would become
considerably higher, on the ground that they now pay only half of the pre-
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sent total contribution of ¥5.93 trillion. Is the idea of this standard contribu
tion rate unrealistic?
In the first place, the employers' contribution is not really paid by
employer but part of the cost is passed to employees whose wages are
reduced and part of the cost is passed to consumers who buy products
of higher prices. It may therefore be reasonable to abolish employer's
contribution and instead raise employee's contribution or state subsidy
through increased consumption tax. In addition, as mentioned above, the
employer's contribution is one of the reasons why companies shift their
employee's status from regular employee to part-time employee, thus dis
torting labour market. We propose therefore to abolish employee's contri
bution and to raise employee's contribution and consumption tax in order
to replace it.
If the same standard contribution rate were imposed on the Society-
Managed Health Insurance, amount of ¥4.44 trillion would be obtained,
which corresponds to 75% of its actual contribution revenue of ¥5.79 trillion
for fiscal 1999.
The proportions of the populations covered by the Municipality-
Managed National Health Insurance, Government-Managed Health In
surance and Society-Managed Health Insurance correspond to 33.4%,
29.5% and 25.6% respectively. In addition, there are other health insurance
schemes, which include Seamen's Insurance (0.2% of the total). National
Government Employees' Mutual Aid Association (2.0%), Local Government
Employees' Mutual Aid Association (2.9%), Private School Teachers' Mu
tual Aid Association (0.7%), Society-Managed National Health Insurance
(3.5%)^'. If we apply the same standard contribution rate to all the insured
of those health insurance schemes, we would raise the total contribution of
¥14.1 trillion, detailed distribution of the revenue from different schemes is
shown in Table 9.
Table 10 shows medical care costs per person by age and age structure
of different health insurance schemes. The national average per capita
medical care cost is ¥244,000. That of National Health Insurance, which
accepts pensioners, is ¥355,000, whereas that of Society-Managed Health
Insurance, which covers smaller proportion of old people, is only ¥157,000.
To adjust this financial difference of different schemes, the Health Services
System for the Elderly was implemented and a structure was established
for all health insurance schemes to contribute equally to the total medical
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Table 9 Actual Financial Resources of Medical Insurance Schemes and
Standardized Insurance Contributions (FY1999)
Application distribution (in 10 thousand)
Contri
bution
revenue
(in ¥100
million)
Standard
The
insured
Family
members
Total
number
covered
(Depend
ency
ratio)
Public
subsidies
(in ¥100
million)
Total
revenue
(in ¥100
million)
ized con
tribution
revenue
(in ¥100
million)
Government-Managed
Health Insurance
1,956 1,781 3,737 91% 59,294 9,597 68,891 44,071
Society-Managed Health
Insurance
1,552 1,685 3,237 109% 57,946 318 58,264 44,446
Seamen's Insurance 9 16 25 178% 507 33 540 258
National Government Employ
ees' Mutual Aid Association
113 145 258 128% 3,961 22 3,983 3,236
Local Government Employees'
Mutual Aid Association
295 369 664 125% 11,950 0 11,950 8,448
Private School Teachers'
Mutual Aid Association
45 38 83 84% 1,659 0 1,659 1,289
Municipality-Managed
National Health Insurance
2,115 2,109 4,224 100% 30,004 44,200 74,204 34,301
Society-Managed National
Health Insurance
183 260 443 142% 5,018 3,307 8,325 5,241
Total 6,268 6,403 12,671 170,339 57,477 227,816 141,290
(Source) National Federation of Health Insurance Societies [2001]
Table 10 Medical Care Costs per Person by Age (FY1999)
Medical care
Age structure of covered
population (in 1,000)
Medical care costs by ag(
(in ¥100 million)
5 group
Age
costs per
person
(¥)
Government-
Managed
Health
Insurance
Society-
Managed
Health
Insurance
National
Health
Insurance
Government-
Managed
Health
Insurance
Society-
Managed
Health
Insurance
National
Health
Insurance
0-14 108,900 6,113 6,209 4,462 6,657 6,762 4,859
15-19 57,600 2,435 2,432 2,030 1,403 1,401 1,169
20-29 82,450 6,673 6,476 4,514 5,502 5,339 3,772
30-39 104,100 5,200 5,704 3,730 5,413 5,938 3,883
40-49 146,650 5,750 5,516 4,810 8,432 8,089 7,054
50-59 235,100 5,576 4,853 5,952 13,109 11,409 13,993
60-69 422,400 3,028 1,293 9,543 12,790 5,462 40,310
70- 850,000 2,028 961 9,938 17,238 8,169 84,473
Total 36,803 33,439 44,979 70,545 52,569 159,463
Medical care
costs per person
244,200 191,681 157,207 354,527
(Source) National Federation of Health Insurance Societies/All-Japan Federation of National Health
Insurance Organizations [2001]
Minister's Secretariat Statistics and Information Department, Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare [2001b]
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care costs of the elderly of 70 years and over. However, It only adjusts the
costs of over 70 years and over and it could not be sustained for the future
with much higher ratio of elderly population. It is necessary to introduce a
mechanism of risk structure adjustment and we will show an example of
the system using the standard contribution rate as stated above.
Per capita medical care costs of different age groups shown in Table 10
are actually per capita National Medical Care Costs of different age groups,
which include cost shared by patients among others, and in order to obtain
medical benefit costs we have to subtract from them the costs of patient
cost sharing and direct state subsidy for public assistance medical care etc.
Table 11 shows statutory benefit rates and effective benefit rates of
each insurance system®*. If a uniform benefit level is set for all the people, it
will be set in the middle of 79.2% of all the medical care insurance system
and 92.7% of the Health Services System for the Elderly (medical care costs
for the elderly comprise a little less than 40% of all the medical care costs).
Here, we adopt 83% of National Medical Care Costs as the standard benefit
rate, taking into consideration that National Medical Care Costs include
state direct subsidy for public assistance which corresponds to 5% of total
National Medical Care Costs.
Table 11 Statutory Benefit Rates and Effective Benefit Rates of
Medical Insurance Schemes
Statutory benefit rate Effective benefit rate %
Government-Managed
Health Insurance
Insured 80% 83.3
79.9Family members Hospitalization 80% 76.1
Outpatient 70%
Society-Managed
Health Insurance
Insured 80% 81.3
78.8
Family members
Hospitalization 80% 75.2
Outpatient 70%
Municipality-Managed
National Health Insurance
General 70% 77.7
78.6
Retirees
Insured 80%
80.8Family
members
Hospitalization 80%
Outpatient 70%
Overall Medical Insurance 79.2
Health Services System
for the Elderly 90% 92.7
Note: Statutory benefit rates are the figures for FY2001
Effective benefit rates are the figures for FY1999
(Source) National Federation of Health Insurance Societies [2001]
24
The total medical care costs of Government-Managed Health Insurance,
Society-Managed Health Insurance and National Health Insurance will be
obtained by adding up all medical care costs of different age groups for
respective systems shown in Table 10. The medical benefits costs for each
scheme will be obtained at this 83%. Here, the age distributions of Mutual
Aid Associations are treated as equal to that of Society-Managed Health
Insurance. Table 12 shows standardized contribution revenue and stan
dardized medical care benefit cost and necessary state subsidy of different
insurance schemes.
Table 12 Standard Contribution Revenue, Standard Benefit Cost and
State Subsidy for Medicai insurance Schemes
Standard Contri
bution Revenue
(in ¥100 million)
Standard
Benefit Cost
(in ¥100 million)
State Subsidy
(in ¥100 million)
Rate of State
Subsidy (%)
Government-Managed
Health Insurance
44,071 59,454 15,383 25.9
Society-Managed Health
Insurance, etc.
62,918 61,457 (-T461) 0.0
Municipality-Managed
National Health Insurance
34,301 124,294 89,993 724
Total 141,290 245,205 105,377
Total contribution revenue for fiscal 1999 is estimated to be around
¥16.2 trillion (¥7.0 trillion by employers and ¥9.3 trillion by the insured)
including contribution for Workmen's Compensation Insurance. Total con
tribution revenue of ¥14.1 trillion shown in Table 12 is lower than the actual
contribution revenue of ¥16.2 trillion, but the reason is clear on the as
sumptions made above. According to the statistics of the National Medical
Care Costs, public subsidy amounted to ¥10.2 trillion (¥7.7 trillion from
State and ¥2.5 trillion from local governments), which included ¥1.6 trillion
of direct subsidy for such medical care costs as public assistance medical
care cost. Therefore to obtain cost of public subsidy for medical care insur
ance and the Health Services for the Elderly, ¥1.6 trillion should be sub
tracted from ¥10.2 trillion. State subsidy of ¥10.5 trillion is ¥1.9 trillion larger
than the actual public subsidy for medical care insurance of ¥8.5 trillion.
However, this difference could be met by raising consumption tax as stated
above to substitute part of the abolished employer's contribution.
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Conclusion
Following is the summatY of main points relating to the idea of stan
dardized contribution rate applied to all health insurance schemes.
1. If the standardized insurance contribution rate is applied to all schemes,
which is equivalent to the present National Health Insurance contribution,
total contribution revenue becomes ¥14.1 trillion.
2. This total amount of insurance contributions does not include em
ployers' contribution (which corresponds to approximately ¥7 trillion at
present), and amounts to 88% of the present total amount of insurance
contributions.
3. The insured of the National Health Insurance excluding pensioners will
contribute insurance contributions at the same rate as is levied now.
4. Because tax allowance for public pension is abolished, pensioners will
pay a greater amount of insurance contributions.
5. Insurance contributions of private and public employees will increase
by about 50%. This means that about half of the employers' contribution is
transferred to the insured. This is one of the main points of this proposal.
6. On the other hand, the new standardized contribution system is appli
cable to all workers, including part-time and irregular workers, and can
increase contributors as a whole, this element of new system works to
lower average insurance contribution. For example, if the present system
of dependent is abolished, and the present part-time workers started to
work as much as they want over the present threshold of ¥1.3 million a
year, and these part-time workers start to pay proper contributions, the
extra contribution revenue would be over ¥500 billion.
7. Total contribution revenue levied for all and state subsidy will be
pooled centrally and it is allocated to each health insurer according to the
medical need of its population. There is no need to establish special insur
ance system for the elderly.
8. State subsidy will be ¥10.5 trillion, which is about ¥1.9 trillion higher
than the present public subsidy for health insurance, but this difference due
to abolishing employers' contribution should be filled by raising consump
tion tax.
9. State subsidy thus allocated becomes in nature the subsidy for individ
ual person with low income or high risk and this enables insurers to stand
on equal financial basis in spite of the characteristics of the insured popula-
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tion. This is contrary to the principle of the present subsidy system, where
insurers of bad management with high medical care costs get more sub
sidy than insurers of good management.
The reason why such risk structure adjustment system is needed is
because it is important to maintain pluralistic insurance structure of au
tonomous insurers, maintaining at the same time financial fairness among
insurers. In other words, insurers must be given a sufficient right of dis
cretion in setting insurance contribution rates and deciding benefit levels
above or below the standard contribution rate and the standard benefit
rate. It is also necessary that insurers have right to deliver services them
selves or pay provider on their own contractual basis. In other words, the
application of standard contribution rate and allocation of budget on stan
dard benefit cost mentioned above serves the basis upon which each
insurer can work freely to attain better use of the resource given on equal
basis.
(Professor, Faculty of Economics)
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Notes
1) See Welfare Pension Fund Association [1999] regarding reform of Swedish public pen
sion. Clasen discusses importance of contribution-based social insurance and, above
all, the significance of income-related social insurance, comparing British social insur
ance with European social insurance (Clasen [2001]).
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2) The medium projection in 2002 estimates that the proportion of the elderly, indicated as
a ratio of the population of 65 years old or older to the total population, will rise from
17.4% for 2000 to 35.7% for 2050 (The National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research [2002]). Projection made in 1997 showed 32.8% for 2050.
3) Webb summarized the new features of social security in the U.K. as opposed to the
post-war employee model social security in the following three points: 1) Co-working
by husband and wife in the form where wives work part-time has become common
place; 2) Structural unemployment has increased and unemployment period has
become longer; and 3) the number of cases where many people cannot maintain the
minimum living costs from employment increased, because low paid workers in
creased. He has pointed out that the UK government has strengthened an income-
tested social security system to cope with such change in the labour market, but that
this has become a factor of hindering incentives towards labour (Webb, S. [1995]). In
Japan, features stated in 2) and 3) would become even greater in the future in addition
to the feature stated in 1). A lesson we can learn from this is that Japan should not look
for a UK type solution to rest heavily on income-tested social security, but should aim
to maintain and substantiate the universal social insurance system.
4) The age distribution of insured without occupation for 1999 shows 55.5% for over 70
years old, 32.0% for the 60s, 5.4% for the 50s, 2.6% for the 40s, 2.4% for the 30s, 2.0%
for the 20s, 0.15 for the 10s (Health Insurance Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare [2001]).
5) See Mitsuya Ichien [1995] for the reason why age structure of different health insurance
schemes calls for the need of fair financial adjustment between the schemes.
6) Age structure and dependants' structure vary among insurers. But if we levy contribu
tions according to the standardized contribution principle and if insurer receives neces
sary standardized benefit cost, all insurers can stand on equal financial basis in spite of
their differences of age distributions and income distributions. This is what risk struc
ture adjustment system of Germany is doing and what finance system of Japanese
long-term care insurance is doing. We are proposing here to apply the same principle
to health insurance schemes.
7) Society-Managed National Health Insurance is community-based health insurance
scheme for particular self-employed groups.
8) The effective benefit rates are the rate of costs met by medical insurance in total med
ical care costs incurred. The actual cost sharing of a patient is set at a fixed rate of med
ical care costs, with upper limit beyond which the insurer reimburses. Moreover, some
insurers have an additional benefit system to reimburse part of the patient cost sharing.
Because of these, the effective benefit rates exceed the statutory benefit rates.
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